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2Thomas F. Cargill·
Whilefinancial liberalization hasfundamentally alteredJapan'sfinan-
cialinstitutionsandmarkets, inparticular, theflow offunds, ithas notyet
hada dramatic effectonthe instrumentsandstrategyofmonetarypolicy.
The framework in which the Bank of Japan conducts its policy is,
nevertheless, on the verge ofa major change as Japan considers estab-
lishing a short-term marketfor government securities.
The liberalizationofJapan's domestic financial sys-
tem has been ongoing since the mid-1970s. Priorto
that time, the financial system was highly con-
strained by regulation and administrative guidance
by the Ministry ofFinance (MOF) and the Bankof
Japan (BOJ). It was characterized by interest rate
ceilings on deposits and loans, limited portfolio
opportunities for market participants, undeveloped
securities markets, and restrictions on international
capital movements. This highly structured, seg-
mented, and regulated system was designed to sup-
portexport-ledeconomic growth, industrialization,
and high personal savings, and to provide a simple
conduit for transferring the large surplus of the
personal sector to finance the large deficits of the
corporate sector.
The oil-priceshockof1973-74and theassociated
end of the "high growth period" were the primary
catalysts for financial liberalization. In particular,
the impact of reduced economic growth on the
established flow offunds pattems set the liberaliza-
tion process in motion1•
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Since then, specific reforms have been designed
to increase the role of market forces by relaxing
interest rate constraints, broadening portfolio
opportunities for market participants, expanding
existing securitiesmarkets anddevelopingnew ones
especially for government debt. To increase Japan's
role in the international financial system, other
reforms aimed at increasing capital flows in and out
of Japan, widening access by foreign financial
institutions to the domestic flow of funds, and
"internationalizing" the yen.
The changes in the flow of funds after 1973-74
andinthe structureofthe financial systemas aresult
of liberalization have fundamentally altered the
financial environmentfor Japanese monetarypolicy.
As a result, the BOJ has had to consider alternative
policy instruments, short-run tactics, and even
longer run strategies ofmonetary policy.
This paper focuses on the changing financial
environment for monetary policy in Japan and its
impact on the conduct and impact of monetary
policy. The subject is developed in four steps. First,
we outline the major features of the flow of funds
prior to liberalization and describe how the mone-
tary policy ofthe BOJ relied on these flow offund
patterns and the highly regulated nature of the
financial system. Second, we indicate the major
changes in the flow offunds that followed the first
oil-price shock of 1973-74 and that resulted from
liberalization. Third, we indicate how thesechangeshave alteredthedomestic financial environ-
mentfacing theBoJandreview the response ofBoJ
policy to these changes. The paper concludes with
some comments on a new policy instrument for the
BoJ.
Since the focus of the paper is on the changing
financial environment for monetary policy, we need
to date the emergence ofthe new environment. As
mentioned, the majorcatalystfor liberalization was
the downward shift in economic growth induced by
theoil-price shock of1973 and the impactofslower
growth on the flow of funds. Nevertheless, 1976
often is regarded as the official startofliberalization
because that was the year the MoFofficially recog-
nizeda competitive money market for repurchase
agreements ingovernment securities, known as the
gensaki market. Thus, the years from 1973 through
1976 may be regarded as the period over which the
new environment for BOJ policy emerged.
Financial liberalization in Japan, however, has
been a more continuous and less crisis-oriented
proGess thanliberalization inthe U.S. Hence, we do
not observe sharp and discrete changes in the con-
duct of monetary policy in response to changes in
Japan'sfinancial environment (Cargill, 1985a and
1985b). Rather, the transition of BoJ policy is
reflected in new and slowly evolving tactics and
strategies ofmonetary policy.
I. The Financial Environment Prior to Liberalization
Two characteristics of the financial environment
priorto liberalizationprovideda foundation forBoJ
policy. First, there were well-established flow of
funds patterns between major nonfinancial and
financial sectors ofthe economy and, second, there
were extensive interestrate and portfolioconstraints
on all major market participants. These character-
istics ensured a close relationship between the
Bars policy instruments and final policy targets.
Table 1reports the surplus and deficit position of
four major nonfinancial sectors in Japan as a per-
centage ofGNP for the period 1965-842•
Priorto 1973, the flow offundswas characterized
by large personal sector surpluses, large corporate
sectordeficits, and comparatively small public sec-
tor deficits. The personal sector surplus averaged
9.2 percent of GNP over the period 1965-72,
whereas the corporate and public sector deficits
averaged 6.5 percent and 2.6 percent of GNP,
respectively.
The public sector deficits were concentrated in
public corporations and local government entities
rather than in the central government. In fact, the
central governmentran small surpluses during most
ofthe 1965-72 period. Net financial flows between
Japanandthe restofthe world were small, reflecting
Japan's tendency toward current account balance.
In addition, a variety ofrestrictions on capital flows
ensured Japan's international financial isolation.
The personalsectorsurpluses were heldprimarily
in the form of currency and of liabilities issued by
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private and public financial institutions (see Box).
Such deposits and currency holdings accounted for
67 percentofthe personalsector'suses offunds over
the 1965-72 period.
The corporate sector deficits were financed pri-
marily by financial institutions as opposed to open
money and capital markets. Over the period
1965c72, loans from private and public financial
institutions accounted for 86.6 percent of the cor-
porate sector's sources of funds. Financial institu-
tions were designed to serve the borrowingneeds of
the business sector in general, and the corporate
sector in particular3.
Corporations relied on indirect rather than direct
financing for several reasons. Equities were not an
attractive funding source because ofthe tax advan-
tages ofdebt over equity, because ofthe practice of
issuing stock at par value rather than market value,
and because of the existence of extensive regula-
tions regarding new stock issues. Domestic money
and capital markets were undeveloped priorto liber-
alization and extensive regulation of capital flows
prevented Japan's corporations from using foreign
capital markets as a source offunding.
Private financial institutions acted as the primary
conduit for funds between the personal and cor-
poratesectors, butwere themselves linkedthrougha
relatively free interbank market. This interbank
market is similar in function and structure to the
federal funds marketinthe U.S. and was oneofonly
two markets not subject to extensive regulation andadministrative guidance. The other market was an
unofficial gensaki market or repurchase market in
government securities that emerged in the late
I960s4.
Table 2 reports the net interbank position of the
city banks, other banks, other private financial
institutions, and the Bank ofJapan in terms oftheir
interbank financial assets less interbank liabilities
over the period 1969-84. The city banks were con-
tinual net demanders of funds from the interbank
market, while other private financial institutions
were continual net suppliers offunds. After 1971,
the BOJ initiated a form ofopen market operations
in the bill component of the market consisting
mainly ofpurchases ofbills, and thus became a net
supplier offunds.
The net demand position of the city banks
resulted from their central role in serving the bor-
rowing needs of the largest and fastest growing
corporations in Japan. Corporations depended on
city banks for a major partoftheirexternal funding
because the city banks were the largest and most
convenient of the private financial intermediaries
with offices throughout the country and.the world.
City banks also had access to BOJ direct crediton a
continual basis, while corporations did not. have
2324
access to open money and capital markets. Most
importantly, city banks played a leadership role in
the large groupings of firms that continue to domi-
nate the industrial structure ofJapan5.
Thecorporate sector's greaterdependenceon city
banks rather than other financial institutions for
external financing accounted for the continued net
demand position ofthe city banks in the interbank
market. Other banks and private financial institu-
tions (see Box) were net suppliers of funds to the
interbank market. Thus, funds from these other
institutions flowed to the corporate sector both
directly and indirectly via the interbank market and
the city banks.
Prior to liberalization, almost 90 percent of the
BOJ's loans and discounts to financial institutions
were made to the city banks. The BOJ encouraged
city bank dependence on the discount window both
by restricting all financial institutions, including
citybanks, to a small setofsources offunds subject
to interestrate controls and by keeping the discount
rate at a level significantly lower than the interbank
loanrate.
Prior to liberalization, virtually all interest rates
in Japan were regulated in oneform or another with
the only significant exceptions being the interbank6
rate and the gensaki rate. Thus, interest rates were
not sensitive to market forces and were not used by
the BOJ in a systematic manner to influence spend-
ing during periods oftight or easy monetary policy.
The overall objective of interest rate control was to
achieve a "low interest rate" environment to stimu-
late corporate investment spending.
WithinJapan's financial environment, avariety of
portfolio constraints sharply segmented financial
institutions and limitedsources and use~offundsfor
all market participants. Banks were not authorized
to issue market-sensitive large CDs, and were lim-
itedinthe varietyofdeposit accounts they could use
to obtain funds. Corporations faced a variety of
regulations and administrative guidance that
provided strongdisincentives to substitute direct for
indirect finance. Since banks were segmented
according to loan maturity, corporations were
restricted to obtaining short-term and long-term
funding from specific types of institutions. Both
banks and corporations were severely restricted
from obtaining funds in the foreign market.Monetary Policy Prior to liberalization
The financial environment that existed in Japan
priortoliberalization supported aclose relationship
between the BOrs policy instruments and final
policy targets and also defined a specific transmis-
sion process for BOJ policy. During this earlier
period, the major policy instruments of the BOJ
were credit rationing at the discount window, varia-
tions in the discount rate, purchases and sales of
commercial bills in the interbank market, and loan
limits on individual banks referred to as "window
guidance". These instruments were used to control
the volume of loans to the corporate sector by
financial institutions in general, and the banking
system in particular. Since the corporate sector had
limited access to securities markets to satisfy exter-
nal funding requirements, the BOJ could thereby
influence corporate investment spending and,
hence, the overall level ofeconomic activity.
By determining the amount ofreserves available
to the banking system the BOJ was able to set the
ultimate constraint on credit creation. Reserves
were supplied through the discount window and a
type of open market operation in the interbank
market. To achieve the targeted path of bank
reserves, the BOJ varied the amount ofdirect credit
to thecity banksandconductedoperationsinthebill
component ofthe interbank market. The BOJ used
the discount window not only as a means for deter-
mining the total reserve base but, just as impor-
tantly, to ration credit to the city banks.
Unlike other institutions, city banks had contin-
uous accesstoBOJcreditand were always willingto
take as much credit as the BOJ was willing to
provide because the discountrate was maintained at
a level below the interbankrate. As aresult, the BOJ
did not employchanges inthe discountrate to affect
thecosts and therebythe willingnessofcity banks to
25borrow and lend, but rather to achieve an
"announcement effect," that is, to signal its inten-
tions with respect to credit expansion.
The BOJ imposed "window guidance" lending
limits on individual banks, including city banks,
regional banks, and other types of financial institu-
tions. City banks were the primary focal point of
window guidance and their dependence on BOJ
direct credit increased the probability that the loan
limits would be respected. Also, the BOJ took into
account existing market shares among different seg-
ments of the market in setting the limits and thus
ensured that institutions not dependent on BOJ
direct credit also would adhere to the limits. The
BOJ fostered the attitude that adherence to the limits
by all institutions would be in their best interest
because it would allow them to maintain their mar-
ket shares7 .
The interbank rate played an important role in the
transmission of BOJ policy and as a policy indica-
tor.
In terms of the transmission process, the inter-
bank rate influenced the cost offunds to city banks,
and this cost was passed on to the corporate bor-
rowers in the form of higher deposit/loan ratios8.
Thus, even in the absence of a change in the cor-
porate loan rate, increased interbankrates raised the
effective cost ofborrowing. Increases in the official
discount rate would amplify this effect since loan
rates were tiedto the discountrate. While this aspect
ofthe transmissionprocess reliedonan interestrate-
expenditure effect, it was secondary to the credit
availability effect achieved by varying the reserve
base, administrative guidance imposed on city
banks at the discount window, and window-guid-
ance on loan limits.
The interbank market ensured that BOJ policy
spread beyond the city banks to institutions other
than the city banks9. For example, regional banks
and other financial institutions were induced by
changes in the interbank rate to substitute interbank
assets for business loans. Regulated loan and
deposit rates ensured the existence of significant
substitution effects between interbank assets and
business loans in response to changes in the inter-
bankrate.
As a policy indicator, the interbank rate reflected
the pressure placed on the city banks. Portfolio
restrictions on the sourcesofbankfunds and interest
rate ceilings forced the city banks to use the inter-
bankmarket as a source offunds whenever the BOJ
restricted funds at the discount window or through
slower purchases ofbills.
Thus, the BOJ's policy instruments influenced
the ability offinancial institutionsto extendcredit to
the corporate sector. And since corporations
depended heavily on intermediation finance, busi-
ness investment also was sensitive to the BOJ's
policy instruments. The well-defined flow offunds
patterns ensured that BOJ influence over the city
banks would translate into influence over all major
financial institutions. The portfolio and interest rate
restrictions on the sources of funds limited the
ability of financial institutions to attract funds in
an effort to offset BOJ intentions. The limited
sources offunding available to the corporate sector
ensured that influence over private intermediation
credit would translate into influence over corporate
spending.
II. Initiation of Financial Liberalization
The financial systemthatexisted prior to the start
ofliberalization(1973-76) served well the industrial
objectives ofJapan. It supported a high rate ofreal
economic growth through the early 1970s and
provided a framework for BOJ policy that enabled
the BankofJapan to support the rapid growth while
maintaining reasonable price stabiIltylO. However,
because this financial structure was incompatible
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with the economic environment that emerged after
the oil-price shock of 1973, the process ofliberali-
zation began.
Reduced economic growth as a result of the oil
price shock in 1973 dramatically affected the flow
offunds patterns in Japan. Growth declined from a
10 percent level to a 3-5 percent level that continues
to the present. While the personal sector surplusremainedatabout 10percentofGNPafter 1973, the
relative positions ofthe corporate and central gov-
ernmentdeficits changed. Thecorporatesectordefi-
cit declined by almost 50 percent as a result ofthe
reduced need for external funding in a slower
growth environment, while the total public sector
deficit roughly doubled.
The changes in flow of funds created pressures
that could only be relieved by a less constrained
financial system. The detailed causes ofthis liberal-
ization are beyond the scope of this paperll.
Instead, we focus on the role of the increased
government sector deficit on the liberalization
process12.
Governmentdebt was not sold in an open market
but placed with a "captive" syndicate ofbanks and
security companies at below-market rates. Syndi-
cate members did not object to this practice prior to
1973 because the amount of debt was small. In
addition, the BOJ was willing to purchase the debt
from the banks at prices that guaranteed no capital
loss and securitycompanies were permittedto oper-
ate an unofficial gensaki market based on govern-
ment debt.
After 1975, the increased government deficits
madethe amountofdebtplacedannuallylarge. This
influenced the liberalization process in two ways.
First, in 1978, the BOJ no longer guaranteed that
the debt would be purchased at favorable prices.
Increasing market resistance forced the MOF to
make a numberofconcessions, the most important
of which were the decisions to offer medium-term
debt at market prices and to reduce the holding
period for syndicate members.
Second, therising volumeofgovernmentdebtled
to the emergence of a growing secondary market.
This market was not regulated and provided a mar-
ket-determinedrate ofinterest that made it difficult
to enforce deposit rate ceilings, especially for large
corporate depositors who were becoming less
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dependent on the banking system and who wanted
to shiftdeposits to higheryielding assets. Anumber
ofobservers have judged the growth ofthe second-
ary bond market in government securities to be a
majorforcefor liberalization by the time ofthe late
1970s (Bank ofJapan, December 1982b).
The impact ofgovernment debt and other forces
therefore initiated financial liberalization in Japan.
Liberalization has been ongoing for more than a
decade now, and, combined with the changes in the
flow offunds, has fundamentally altered the finan-
cialenvironmentfor BOJpolicy. Whilethe Japanese
financial system remains highly regulated, market
forces now play a more important role in allocating
funds. Both money and capital markets have
expanded, and controls over international capital
flows have been relaxed.
Regulators have permitted financial institutions
to offer a wider range of deposits (including
deposits not subject to ceilings, such as large CDs),
and have adjusted deposit rate ceilings more fre-
quently. They also have relaxed controls over loan
rates.
The volume of large CDs has expanded since
their authorization in 1979, as has the volume of
gensaki trade after official recognition in 1976. A
yen-dominated bankers' acceptance market has
recently been established, and regulators are con-
sidering establishing a short-term or T-bill market
for government debt. The long-term securities mar-
ket has expanded greatly from the increase in out-
standing government debt.
In 1980, Japan accepted as a general principlethe
idea that international capital flows should not be
restricted. Since that date, there has been a signifi-
cant increase in funds flowing into and outofJapan.
In addition, Japan has increased access by foreign
financial institutions, and taken other steps to make
the yen more acceptable as an international invest-
ment and reserve asset.III. Changing Domestic Environment for Monetary Policy
The pre-liberalization transmission of monetary
policyinJapancanbesummarizedbyFigure1. This
transmission.processWas.based on a well-defined
flow of funds. pattern between financial and nonfi-
nancial sectors and an extensive set ofinterest rate
and portfolio constraints on market participants.
Molletary policy.fOCllSfe(}. ()lJ, ..credit.as the inter-
mediatetarget and empl()yed creditallocation con-
trols to achieve the desired targets for credit.
Although theBOl used the interbank rate as an
operating variable and policy indicator, it did not
emphasize the interest rate-expenditure channel of
monetary policy. Variations in the interbank rate
were designedto influence theportfoliodecisions of
noncity banks with the overall objective ofcontrol-
ling the quantity rather than the priceofintermedia-
tion credit.
Change in .the flow of funds patterns after 1973
along with the liberalization process reduced the
roleofprivateintermediationcreditas adeterminant
ofspending and weakened the ability ofthe BOJ to
control intermediation credit in general.
The most significantchange for BOJpolicy was a
gradual decline inthe role ofindirectfinance (Table
3). The corporate sector, now a smaller deficit unit,
gained increased flexibility to obtain funds in open
markets. Money markets themselves expanded, as
did long-term security markets for government
debt. While Japan does not yet possess a setofopen
money and capital markets matching the depth and
breadthofthose inthe U.S., directfinancial transac-
tions have steadily increased in importance.
A discrete shift in the deficit position of the
corporate andpublic sectors was associated withthe
decline inintermediationfinance. The reducedneed
for external funding by the corporate sector and
changes in the financial systemasa resllitofliberal-
ization lessened the dependfence ..of the cOrporate
sector, especiallylargecorporations, onthebanking
system. Accompanying the absolute decline. in the
corporate sector's funding requirements has been a
shift, made possible bylibemlizati()lJ" in itsSOllrces
of funding. While the major increase.in securities
market activities is associatedwith the mounting
size of outstanding government debt, corporations
have taken advantage of the growing market as a
source of external funding. Issues of securities
accountedfor 14.2percentofthe funds raisedby the
corporate sectoroverthe 1973-83 period, compared
to 10.8 percent over the 1965-72 period.
Thedeclining dependence ofthe corporate sector
on bank credit has, in tum, been responsible for a
decline in the market share ofcity banks. In almost
every year since 1962, city banks have lost market
share to other private financial institutions. The
actual percentage ofcity bank assets to total assets
of private financial institutions dropped from 32.1
percent in 1969 to 26.1 percent in 1983.
In addition to the decline in city banks' market
share ofprivate intermediation, a shiftinflows away
from private to public intermediaries also may
impede BOJ policy. Government financial institu-
tions accounted for 16.1 percentofthe total flow of
funds to final borrowers (Table 3) in 1972, but by
1982, their contribution had increased to 29.2 per-
cent. Funds transferred through public intermedi-
aries are believed to be less sensitive to BOJ policy
than those transferred through private intermedi-
aries.
Figure 1
Monetary Policy Transmission -
Before Liberalization
Policy
Bank of Japan • Instruments.
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• Intermediation Credit • InvestmentLiberalizationalso has reducedtherelative sizeof
the interbank market in the flow of funds,and
allowed city banks to reduce their dependence on
BOJ direct credit. Although the interbank loan
marketrernmnscentral tothe transIllissionofBOJ
policy, the rapid growth of new money market
instruments~inbothyenandforeign currencies~
has reduced its relative importance. Priorto liberal-
ization, the interbank market represented approx-
imately 70 percent of total money market transac-
tions; by June 1985 (Toshihiko Fukui, 1986), it
represented only 27.4 percent.
The Bank ofJapan's pre~liberalization monetary
policy tactics were based on the strong incentive of
city banks to borrow from the BOJ. As city banks
now have the ability toofferfinancial assets thatare
more market-sensitive, especially large CDs, they
have become less dependent on BOJ credit. The
Bank of Japan's loans and discounts to city banks
have consequently declined as a percentage ofcity
banks' liabilities during the past ten years. In addi-
tion, whilecitybanksarestill the majorrecipients of
BOJ credit, other institutions have become more
dependent on BOJ credit than in the past.
In sum, corporations now have sources offund-
ingotherthanbankcredit. Banksandotherfinancial
institutions also have use of expanded•sources of
funding thathave made themlessdependentonboth
the BOJfordirect creditandthe interbankmarket.
Liberalization has also increased both the role of
interestrates in portfolio managementand the inter-
est-sensitivity ofprivate spending 13.
Implicationsfor Monetary Policy
Together, •these developments have·forced the
BOJto considernew operating tactics andeven new
strategies for monetary policy. The BOJ has
responded in several ways, although the changes
have evolved slowly. One does not observe inJapan
the discrete changes in eithertactics orstrategies of
the kind exemplified by the Federal Reserve's
announced shift in policy in October 1979.
First, as liberalization has rendered interest rates
more responsive to market forces, the BOJ has
increasingly emphasized the interest rate-expendi-
ture paradigm in the transmission ofmonetary pol-
icy to influence spending decisions. It has
increasingly used policy instruments that are cap-
29able of influencing interest rates within a market
environment.
Second, theBOJhas cometoregardopenmarket
operations as a more flexible instrument for influ-
encing interest rates than either the discount win-
doworwindow guidance. Atthis time, however, the
BOJdoes not have a flexible open market operation
policy instrument because there is no competitive
short-tenngovernmentsecuritiesmarket. Instead, it
has confined its open market operations to the
interbank market and,recently, conducted opera-
tions in large CDs.
The increasing emphasis on open market opera-
tions also has been a response to the declining role
of credit as an intennediate target. In 1972, loans
made by private financial institutions represented
27.2percentofthe financial assets ofall sectors; by
1984, theyhaddeclinedto21.8percentofall assets.
Claims on the rest of the world and the central
government increased in relative importance.
The de-emphasis .on credit control received offi-
cialsanctionin 1978 whenthe BOJbegantopublish
projections of the money supply for each quarter.
The BOJ, at least officially, now regards the money
supply as the primary measure of liquidity in the
economy. This has led some observers such as
Milton Friedman (1983) to suggest that the BOJ is
nowfollowing amonetariststrategyofstable mone-
tary growth. Despite the frequent reference in BOJ
publications to the role ofmoney, there is reason to
believe that the BOrs conversion to monetarism is
less than complete (see Michael M. Hutchison in
this Economic Review).
Third, the BOJ has reduced the role of direct
credit allocation instruments such as windowguid-
ance. Although window guidance limits are still
imposed, they are now partofa so-called voluntary
systeminwhichindividual bankstake aleadingrole
in setting the limits14.
The BOrs shift from a credit-control paradigm
toward an interest rate-expenditure paradigm is, in
essence, a modification of its earlier policy frame-
work. The BOJ has added another channel and
another policy instrument that emphasizes the rela-
tionship between the interbank rate and interest
rates in general. It continues to focus on the inter-
bankrate, bankcreditingeneral andcitybankcredit
in particular, and it still relies on various types of
administrative guidance to influence the portfolio
behavior offinancial institutions.
The pre-liberalization transmission process has
not been replaced, but augmented. The BOrs pol-
icy instruments are stilldirected toward influencing
the flow of intennediation credit, but are now also
concerned with influencing the cost of credit and
interest rates in general, that is, with influencing
fund flows throughprimaryordirectmarketsas well
as through intennediation markets. The new trans-
mission process is sketched in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Monetary Policy Transmission -
After Liberalization
Policy




The effective monetary and credit policies ofthe
Bank of Japan are in transition as the Bank re-
evaluates~d adjusts them inresponse.to the new
financial environment of the 1980s. The BOJ has
increasingly expressed concern that familiar instru-
ments such as the discount window and window
guidancecannotcontinuetoprovide the basis for an
effective policy in the new environment. In this
regard, BOJ has strongly advocated the establish-
ment of an. open and competitive market in short-
term government securities. Such a market would
yield a flexible policy instrument for affecting inter-
estrates directly as well as via the intermediaries'
access to reserves.
Japan's Ministry ofFinance has not beenrecep-
tive to establishing such a market in short-term
government securities. At present, ••,theBOJis
requiredto purchaseandholdmostoftheshort-term
government debt since the MOP prices,the debt at
such low rates that syndicate members refuse to
purchase it. This state ofaffairs cannot continue.
At the time of this writing, the outcome of the
short-term govel1.lment securities market issue has
not been decided. But ifthe past is any indication,
the MOP will be required to make short-term gov-
ernment debt more responsive to market forces.
When this occurs, the BOJ will obtain a new and
majorpolicy instrumentthat will further emphasize
interest rate effects.
FOOTNOTES
1. This is not to ignore a variety of other factors such as
binding interest rate ceilings, advances in computer tech-
nology, and financial innovations introduced bythe private
marketthat have played a role in the liberalization process
but have not been dominant.
Authoritative discussions of the financial system in Japan
and the recent changes are provided by Yoshio Suzuki
(1980 and 1986). Other references include Thomas F.
Cargill (1985a, 1985b), Charles Pigott (1983), and Shoichi
Royama (1983-84). Raymond W. (3oldsmith (1983)
prOVides an overview of the developmentofJapan's finan-
cial system from 1868 through 1977.
2. The flow of funds accounts in Japan are published by
the BOJ and are similar in construction to those for the U.S.
They reflect the financial aspects of the real saving and
investment decisions of the major nonfinancial sectors of
the economy: public or government, corporate business,
personal, and rest of the world sectors.
In the Japanese accounts, the business sector refers only
to incorporated businesses; the personal sector includes
both households and unincorporated businesses. The
practice of highlighting the corporate sector and de-
emphasizing unincorporated firms reflects the importance
of the corporate sectorin the Japanese economy.
3. The flow of funds accounts do not provide detailed
information on consumer and mortgage credit. However,
consumer and, mortgage credit comprised a relatively
small part of the lending activities of financial institutions.
4. The repurchase market for government securities, or
gensaki market, emerged in the late 1960s and was not
officially recognized until 1976. It was Japan's only com-
petitive short-term money market. The interbank market
differed from the gensaki market in that transactions and
interest rates in the interbank market were subject to
administrative influence; participation in the market was
limited to financial institutions.
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5. The firm groupings are often referred to as the "main
bank system." They form a unique Japanese structure of
financial and nonfinancial firms interrelated by service,
production,and financial relationships, and supported by
extensive reciprocal holdings of equities. The phrase
"main banksystem" is derivedfrom thefactthatacity bank
stands at the centerofthe structure and provides financial
resources and financial services, and acts as a general
spokesperson for the firms in the grouping.
The main bank system is discussed in more detail byC. D.
Elston (1981). Iwao Nakatani (1984) presents empirical
research on the behavioral characteristics of group and
nongroup firms.
6. BOJ administrative influence over the interbank rate
rendered it less sensitive to marketforces than the gensaki
rate. See also footnote 4.
7. An interesting insight into the interaction between the
BOJ and the banks that form the basisofwindowguidance
is provided by Tadashi Yasuda (1981).
8. Japanese banks typically imposed large deposit/loan
ratios on their borrowers and adjusted these ratios accord-
ing to the availabilityoffundS. Based on survey information
(Masahiko Takeda, 1985" p. 77), the deposit/loan ratio
averaged about 45 percent prior to liberalization.
9. Suzuki (1980) hasdeveloped a detailed theoretical and
empirical model of how the BOJ influenced the lending
decisions of financial institutions.
10. In fact, several researchers (Hamada and Hayashi,
1985 and Pigott, 1978) investigating the natural-rate
hypothesis in Japan have found that countercyclical mon-
etary policy appears to have been effective at least
through the late 1970s. Their findings reject the natural-
rate hypothesis and are inconsistent with some of the
empirical research for the U.S. Pigott suggests that the
explanation for the 'Japanese results may reside in theregulated and narrow flow-of-funds channels that domi-
nated the Japanese financial system for much of the post-
war period.
11. References tothis subject can be found in footnote 1.
12.•The role of government deficitsasacatalyst for finan-
cial reform in Japan and a number of· countries in the
Pacific Basin regions is discussed by Michael M.
Hutchison (1985).
13.M. A. Akhtar (1983) estimated aggregate demand
functions for Japan over the period from 1962 through
1982, andfoundthatthe interestrateeffecthadbecomean
important determinantoftotal spending bythe mid-1970s.
14. Robert A. Feldman (1983, p. 198), however, suggests
thatitisdifficultto determineempiricallytheextenttowhich
Window guidance is still effective.
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